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Abstract
Security Science education at university levels is still in its infancy, with little agreement towards knowledge,
curriculum and competency. Therefore, it is essential that educators draw on relevant literature highlighting
means of efficient and effective knowledge transfer for tertiary students within the Security Science domain. Such
knowledge transfer will reduce the gap between academic knowledge (explicit) and professional competency
(tacit knowledge). This paper presents phase one of a multiphase study.
A qualitative “systems based knowledge structure” of security domain categories has been conceptually mapped
as a domain heuristic. The heuristic drew on research highlighting that experts have both richer depths of
domain knowledge and superior cross referenced organizational structure. The conceptual map takes a topdown approach bounded by routine activity, rational choice, situational crime prevention, defence in depth,
security decay and management theories within the elements of prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery. Results indicate that within a systems approach, core security professional competencies relate to the
ability to skilfully apply the theories and best practice principles represented within the preliminary heuristic
that brings together academic theory with practising security strategies.
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INTRODUCTION
Professional knowledge is based on combinations of explicit and implicit domain specific knowledge, used in
such a way that an individual can solve new problems within a professional domain by drawing on existing
cognitive structures. The developing profession of Security Science requires a means of transferring domain
category knowledge in an efficient and meaningful manner for enhanced problem solving capabilities. It is
therefore essential that novice learners (students) within the security domain are explicitly presented with an
organizational structure of physical security knowledge categories to ensure they are able to employ a rich
framework of cross referenced concepts in their future problem solving endeavours.
Educators in the physical security fraternity have always recognised the need for experience in robust learning.
However, this paper argues that the gap between explicit and implicit learning can be reduced by drawing on the
literature of expertise, specifically, security experts. Experts not only have a rich volume of domain knowledge,
supported through many years of practical experience, but their knowledge is strongly cross referenced with a
rich network of connections between domain concepts. Such highly organized domain concepts facilitate more
efficient retrieval for professional problem solving. This paper presents such an organized knowledge structure
through the use of a physical security domain concept map. Such a map is focused towards developing more
meaningful learning at the conceptual level, therefore enhancing the journey from novice to competent security
professional.
Objective
The objective of this paper is to respond to the question: What are the core professional competencies for a
security professional and where are they drawn from? The work considers the premises of Manunta (1999),
Burke (cited in Griffiths, Brooks & Corkill, 2011, p. 2), the Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task
Force (2008) and the earlier works of William’s (1981), who proposed a “security systems design philosophy” to
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present an explicit knowledge based, functional top-down system philosophy (heuristic) as an educational tool
(schemata) for Security Science novice learners.

IS SECURITY DEVELOPING AS A PROFESSION?
Industry professionals have become essential to the very functioning of modern society. As Donald (1983, pp. 34) highlighted “we look to professionals for the definition and solution of society’s problems”. Within the
security domain the Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task Force (2008) identified security
professionals as senior people working in the operational and strategic sector of the security industry. The task
force further defined security professionals as a group critical in supporting the protection of government,
commercial organisations, non-government organisations and the community. However, the task force
highlighted that security professionals have not been able to contribute their full potential to the nation’s security
and safety, primarily due to a lack of clear understanding of either the profession or security professionals. In
addition, Donald (1983, pp. 4-5) points out that as a society we see and experience failures of professional
action, resulting in the loss of public confidence and calls for external regulation of professional activity.
Recently, attention has been focused towards identifying the core professional competencies of security
professionals. However, as Brooks (2010, p. 225) points out, security is a diverse and multi-disciplinary
profession with a wide spectrum of activities and skills.
Security’s diversity has resulted in a lack of professional consensus relating to a definition (Borodzicz & Gibson,
2006, p.182; Manunta, 1999, p. 58) and arguably, professional standing. As Borodzicz and Gibson (2006)
suggest, the concept of security can have different meanings depending on context. For example, Manunta
(1999, p. 58) argues that the variety of security’s descriptive definitions are inadequate, purporting that security
must be considered by a more functional, clearer definition. Such a view is supported by Burke (cited in
Griffiths, Brooks & Corkill, 2011, p. 2) who argues that for security to be useful it must be defined in terms of
its practices.
In considering diversity in both approach and definition, Brooks (2008, p. 5) argued that security may only
achieve definition through applied context and concept definition, where definition may be achievable through a
consensual body of knowledge. In considering definitional barriers and discordant views, two common
professional threads are supported. Firstly, there is a desire on the part of practitioners to protect assets that they
hold to be valuable from deliberate malicious human intervention through a variety of countermeasures
(Borodzicz & Gibson, 2006, pp. 181-182). Second and from a functional perspective, for security to be effective
it must be implemented within a “systems” approach (Underwood, 1984; Fennelly, 1997; Fisher & Green, 2003;
Garcia, 2001).
Developing a Security Science body of knowledge
Wilensky (1964, p. 138) highlighted that for an occupation to assert professional authority it must first find a
technical basis, assert an exclusive jurisdiction, link both skill and jurisdiction to standards of training, and
convince the public that its services are uniquely trustworthy. To these points the Australian Interim Security
Professional’s Task Force (2008) accepted that for security to be considered a profession, it must include the
characteristics of a distinct body of knowledge, agreed and enforced standards of behaviour/ethics, standards of
education, formal requirement for professional development and a college of peers; yet to date this has not
occurred. Wilensky (1964, p. 138) argued that the success of a claim for professional is greatest where the
society evidences strong wide spread consensus regarding the knowledge or doctrine to be applied.
A study by Brooks’s (2007) presented fourteen hierarchical security subject categories (Table 1) across many
associated industries within many occupations. These subject categories hierarchically represent the salient
practice areas in which security as a discipline draws its body of knowledge.
Table 1. Hierarchical security domain subject categories

Criminology
Facility management
Investigations
Risk management
Security management

Security domain subject category descriptors
BCM
Fire science
Industrial security
Information & Computer
Physical security
Security principles
Safety
Security law
Security technology
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Brooks (2006, p. 173) highlights that whilst security practitioners originate from many disciplines, security
experts hold a rich knowledge structure. Such a view is congruous with studies highlighting that a large or
organized body of domain knowledge is a prerequisite to expertise (Bedard & Chi, 1992, p. 135). Conversely,
within the context of tertiary education, Lussier (2006, p. 22) highlights that many graduates do not know how to
employ academic knowledge.
Furthermore, Vu, Rigby, Wood and Daly (2011, p. 3) highlight that strong research-based evidence exists that
professional employability requires graduates to be able to demonstrate their achievement of graduate attributes
in order to enable novice learners to apply their knowledge critically and reflectively. As Nalla and Morash
(2002, p. 9) point out, core ideas must be passed on to students within a discipline for them to succeed. This
view leads to the question; what are the core professional competencies for security graduates and professionals
and where do they come from? To the latter, Wilensky (1964, p. 144) suggested that as an occupation moves
towards professional standing, its formal training schools at some stage either begin or seek out university
involvement where there is a steady development of standards in study, academic degrees and research programs
to expand the knowledge base. This development for security at the tertiary level is still in its infancy, with
limited consensual agreement on content requirements (Brooks, 2010).
Accordant with such discourse, The Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task Force (2008, p. 10) asserted
that the Australian security profession has a distinct body of knowledge. However, a characteristic of
professional knowledge is how knowledge is applied varies with the situation (Stake, 2010, p. 13). For example,
Stake (2010, p. 13) explains professional work depends on science, but each profession has its own separate
body of knowledge. It is therefore considered that professional knowledge differs from scientific knowledge,
although overlaps exist. Cornford and Athanasou (1995, p. 12) suggest the situation can be summed on a
continuum (Figure 1).

Figure 1. The professional development continuum
(Cornford & Athanasou, 1995, p. 12)
According to Wilensky (1964, pp. 149-150) the optimal base of knowledge or doctrine for a profession is a
combination of intellectual and practical knowing, some of which is explicit (classifications and generalizations
learned from books, lectures and demonstrations), and some implicit (understanding acquired from supervised
practice and observation). Wilensky’s (1964, pp. 149-150) views are supported by Griffiths, Brooks and Corkill
(2011, p. 3) who highlight that professional bodies of knowledge are both academic and practical requiring both
education and training to be passed on.
Within such a continuum, novices seek logical, fairly consistent all purpose rules to guide their behaviour
(Cornford &, Athanasou, 1995, p. 12). Furthermore, novices start with little domain knowledge and use weak
methods to solve problems (Eysenck & Keane, 2001, p. 421), whilst advanced beginners start to employ
experience problem solving processes. Competent level practitioners exercise greater authority in problem
solving, they set priorities and make plans, they determine what is important and understand that the order of
priority may change. Nevertheless, proficient practitioners may no longer consciously think about adjustments,
for them intuition or “know-how” becomes important.
It can be argued that for security advice to be professionalthat is soundly based in theory and established
practice (norms)then identifying core security competencies means highlighting its explicit domain knowledge
structure. Furthermore, these combined characteristics must be cross referenced with a rich network of
connections amongst the subordinate concepts and represented collectively as an organised system from a topdown (theory/practice) approach. Security is more practitioner-oriented (Nalla & Morash, 2002, p. 9), therefore
these core norms (knowledge structure) are focused towards various processes, measures, functions and tasks
which are considered essential.
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UNDERLYING THEORY
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge; the critical study of its validity, methods and scope (The Collins
Concise Dictionary, p. 417). The central concern of epistemology is the growth of knowledge (Fraser, 1993, p.
16). Consistent with such literature, the underlying theory for this study is trivial constructivism within the
assimilation theory paradigm. Constructivism holds that knowledge is constructed (not discovered) based on
previous knowledge and is evolving over time (Novak, 1993, p. 167); where trivial constructivism recognises
that new ideas are built on the foundation of prior ideas (Fraser, 1993, p. 16). That is, knowledge has structure, a
history of creation and affective connotations (Novak, 1993, p. 171).
According to Novak (1993, pp. 171-172), Ausubel’s (1963) assimilation theory placed central emphasis on
cognitive processes involved in knowledge acquisition and the role that explicit concept and propositional
frameworks play in knowledge acquisition. From the standpoint of formal education, Ausubel, Novak and
Hanesian (1968, pp. 21-27) highlight clearly distinct forms of learning. That is, the distinction between reception
and discovery learning and between rote and meaningful learning. Ausubel, et al, (1968) articulates the
viewpoint that most of the understandings learners acquire both in and out of formal schoolings are presented
rather than discovered. In reception learning (rote and meaningful) the entire content to be learned is presented in
its final form. Thus, students are not required to engage in independent discovery; learners are only required to
internalize and incorporate the material for availability and recall at some later time. For meaningful reception
learning the potential meaningful task or material is comprehended by the student or made meaningful in the
process of internalization.
In contrast, discovery learning incorporates an essential featurethe principle content is not presentedbut
must be discovered by the student before it can be meaningfully incorporated into the learner’s cognitive
structure. According to Ausubel, et al, (1968, p. 24) the first phase of learning by discovery requires a different
process from that of reception learning. First, learners must rearrange information, integrate it with existing
cognitive structures and reorganize or transform the integrated combination in such a way that they can generate
a desired-end-product or discover a missing means-end relationship. After such learning is complete, the
discovered content is made meaningful in much the same way as that presented content is made meaningful in
reception learning.
Evaluating these different learning modes Ausubel, et al, (1968, p. 26) argues that discovery learning, or
discovery methods of teaching are not an efficient primary means of transmitting the content of an academic
discipline. Ausubel (1963) rejected the role of discovery learning arguing that reception learning could lead to
more meaningful learning; putting forward the idea of an advanced organizer which could serve as a cognitive
bridge between new knowledge to be learned and existing relevant concepts and propositions in the learner’s
cognitive structure (Novak, 1993, p. 172). According to Fraser (1993, p. 31) a constructivists approach within
assimilation theory posits that learning is in essence a process of making connections, or seeing relationships.

METHODOLOGY
This paper presents phase one of a multi-phased study. Phase one applied a qualitative literature critique, which
draw on the underlying theory of constructed knowledge to present a preliminary cross-referenced concept map
(organized structure) of security professional’s knowledge category connections. Working on the underpinnings
of constructivism (Novak, 1993, p. 175), concept mapping has been supported as a useful tool (heuristic) in both
planning instruction, helping students learn how to learn and to illustrate key ideas. That is, concept maps
articulate the key concepts and propositions of a subject matter and their interrelationships. Concept (cognitive)
maps are hierarchically ordered from a “top-down” approach.
The literature critique presented a design and planning heuristic as a rich network of cross referenced
connections amongst security concepts (theory/ practices) as an organised body of knowledge for future security
professionals. Such an approach is consistent with the Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task Force
(2008), using both established theory and best practice approaches stemming from within defined knowledge
categories (Brooks, 2010).

RESULTS
A concept map was developed, commencing as an all encompassing “top down” model towards protective
security (Figure 2). This model is consistent with the Australian Government’s approach to security (2008, p.
III), represented within the elements of Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery. Such an approach is
accordant with Underwood’s (1984, pp. 3-4) two type offender typology, encompassing opportunistic and
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deliberate offenders. Underwood’s (1984) deliberate adversary model highlights the need to prevent purposeful
actions against organisational, commercial or governmental objectives. From there, to be prepared in case such
actions manifest, to respond and when negative affects manifest, recover in the shortest possible time to
reengage business objectives (HB 167, 2006, pp. 63-64). Thus, such a model is located at the top of the
hierarchical structure of the concept map.

Figure 2. Preliminary conceptual map of security theory driven knowledge domains
Prevention and Preparedness
The first elements “prevention and preparedness”, requires the concept to be able to “stop” an action outcome.
This requirement draws on Routine Activity Theory (RAT) (capable guardian), where it is argued that suitable
security controls alter the likelihood of convergence in space and time of motivated offenders, suitable target and
an absence of capable guardian against attack (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589). RAT is considered within the
Rational Choice Theoretical (RCT) frame, which considers the cost benefits of an adversary action (expected
utility). This approach entwines concepts such as taste (or distaste) and preference for the offence, moral values,
proclivity for violence and preference for risk (Winoto, 2003, p. 2).
Rational cues not to offend against protected assets employ situational variables or Situational Crime Prevention
theory (Clarke, 1980, pp. 138-140), where offenders respond to the chances of being detected (detection), the
difficulty in achieving the task (delay) and the chances of being caught (response) achieved through defence in
depth. Defence in depth is underpinned by the elements of detection, delay, response and recovery. In addition,
within the detection element, security is interwoven with fire life safety within a public security approach (Cohn,
1981, p. 99; Craighead, 2003, pp. 22-24) and therefore, detecting fire must be considered. Consistent with the
response element of prevention, preparedness, response and recovery, and defence in depth, there must be a
means for executing various levels of response for adversary actions including primary, secondary and where
necessary tactical response capabilities (Garcia, 2006, pp. 237-246).
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Once individual elements of defence in depth have been commissioned within a systems approach (Kovacich &
Halibozek, 2006, pp. 37-46), the measurable process that achieves security needs to be considered. This relates
to the individual measures that achieve holistic security (Garcia, 2001; 2008), which need to be established and
maintained at their commissioned levels of effectiveness. As such, the top down approach must also include
decay theory (Coole, 2010, pp, 234-235). This aspect requires management theory, which considers that
managers are responsible for achieving organisational objectives through the efficient utilization of resources,
underpinned by functions such as planning, organising, leading, controlling (Lussier, 2006, pp. 6-19),
compliance (Kovacich & Halibozek, 2006) and span of control (Sennewald, 2003, p. 59). Given that a physical
protection system combines people, procedures and equipment management theory must be considered in
achieving a successful output for the system.
Best Practice Approach to Security Systems
Consistent with Umibe (1991, p. 359) and the Australian Interim Security Professional’s Task Force (2008), the
preliminary conceptual map of theory driven security category knowledge domains is supported by best practice
approaches towards achieving a top-down systems based approach to physical security (Figure 3). Best practice
approach commences with a threat analysis ensuring the system is threat driven (Williams, 1981, p. 142;
Sennewald, 2003, p. 196; HB 167, 2006, p. 40; Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, p. 7). Following threat identification,
risk management defines individual component deliverable levels (HB 167, 2006, p. 69; Talbot & Jakeman,
2009, p. 11), achieving a threat driven risk based systems approach. The next stage considers the practice of
demarcating and dividing space into zones of protection (Williams, 1981, p. 143; SAND Institute, 2002, p. 5)
referred to as compartmentalizing (Bintliff, 1992, p. 130). This practice also considers employing crime
prevention through environmental design (CPTED) as design inputs into the system, underpinned by the
overlapping strategies of natural access control, natural surveillance and territorial reinforcement (Crowe, 2000,
pp. 1-36).

Figure 3. A preliminary conceptual map of cross referenced security category knowledge domains
Best practice encompasses protection in depth, involving a number of distinct measures an adversary must defeat
in sequence and considers the avoidance of single point failure in any protection plan (Williams, 1981, p. 143;
American Institute of Architects, 2001, p. 11; Garcia, 2008, p. 6), considered the “rings of protection” (Higgins,
1989, p. 229). Protection incorporates multiple detection measures, multiple delay measures and multiple
response capabilities and back-up systems (Williams, 1981, p. 143; Garcia, 2008, p. 6), to complement each
other, overcome individual weaknesses and minimise the consequences of component failure (Garcia, 2008, pp.
5-6). This approach is supported by the practice of distributing the target within a protected environment (Garcia,
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2001). Distribution increases the time required to penetrate all components, the intelligence required to
successfully locate each asset and security controls, the resources required to compromise each asset and
therefore, increasing the overall level of difficulty (Rational Choice).
Such an approach is supported by the setting of individual component performance measures (Garcia, 2008, p. 5)
and applications of hierarchical- principles-combinations (Williams, 1981, pp. 145-147) across technical,
procedural and physical controls. This functionally achieves the elements of defence in depth including intrusion
detection and tamper detection, security lighting, access control, closed circuit television in what Bintliff (1992,
p. 315) refers to as layered technology-based security, supported by physical delay constituents and response
capabilities (See Williams, 1981, pp. 145-147; Bintliff, 1992. Fennelly, 1997; Konicek & Little, 1997;
Cieszynski, 2001; Garcia, 2001; 2008; IESNA G-1-03 Security Lighting Comittee, 2003; Fisher & Green, 2004).
Such a system is considered, whilst being cognisant of the legal framework including relevant laws, regulations
and standards, as guiding the implementation of individual protection components (Kovacich & Halibozek,
2006, pp. 37-46; Garcia, 2008, p. 5). Within this approach, the practice of investigating and analysing security
related incidents supported in the writings of Astor (1978, pp.153-160), and consistent with the recovery element
(HB 167, 2006, pp. 63-64; Australian Government, 2008, p. III) is holistically supported through robust business
continuity management (Talbot & Jakeman, 2009, pp. 365-367).
Furthermore, for both teaching and learning purposes, it can be useful to represent visually the interrelationships
between concepts. As such, concept maps (Figures 2 & 3) are graphically condensed (Figure 4) to represent a
threat driven risk based design heuristic for security systems planning.

Figure 4. Threat driven risk based design philosophy for security systems

CONCLUSION
This paper presented phase one of a multiphase study. Results indicate that within a systems approach to security
the core professional competencies for a security professional relate to their ability to skilfully apply knowledge
from the theories and best practice principles embodied within the security domain planning and management
heuristic. This heuristic was approached accordant with the works of Fraser (1993, p. 18), who pointed out that
as a construction, knowledge is changeable as people revise their constructions of knowledge and incorporate
new information in different ways into their existing conceptual frameworks. The heuristic map (Figure 2) takes
55

a top-down approach bounded by routine activity, rational choice, situational crime prevention, defence in depth,
security decay, and management theories, within the elements of prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery. It is argued this heuristic will enhance more meaningful learning within security science and bring
together academic theory with practising security strategies. It is proposed that this heuristic will be adjusted
throughout the remaining phases of the study; however, phase one supported the viability of further phases
towards the development of a consensus heuristic for the security domain.
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